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Abstract—After one year since the entry into force of the
GDPR, all web sites and data controllers have updated their
procedure to store users’ data. The GDPR does not only cover
how and what data should be saved by the service providers, but
it also guarantees an easy way to know what data are collected
and the freedom to export them.
In this paper, we carry out a comprehensive study on the
right to access data provided by Article 15 of the GDPR. We
examined more than 300 data controllers, performing for each
of them a request to access personal data. We found that almost
each data controller has a slightly different procedure to fulfill
the request and several ways to provide data back to the user,
from a structured file like CSV to a screenshot of the monitor. We
measure the time needed to complete the access data request and
the completeness of the information provided. After this phase of
data gathering, we analyze the authentication process followed by
the data controllers to establish the identity of the requester. We
find that 50.4% of the data controllers that handled the request,
even if they store the data in compliance with the GDPR, have
flaws in the procedure of identifying the users or in the phase
of sending the data, exposing the users to new threats. With the
undesired and surprising result that the GDPR, in its present
deployment, has actually decreased the privacy of the users of
web services.
Index Terms—GDPR, Law Compliance, Privacy, Data Con-
trollers, Web services
I. INTRODUCTION
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1] is a
regulation of the European law on data protection and privacy.
The regulation protects personal data of natural persons and
lays down the rules relating to the free movement of personal
data. The GDPR entered into force in May 2018, and all the
entities that control data and are located or offer services in the
European Economic Area (EEA) must comply with it. The law
applies to entities that monitor behaviors that take place in the
European Union, even if they do not provide any direct service.
Article 15 of the law establishes one of the most fundamental
rights in the Internet: The users have the right to request to
web sites a copy of all the personal data that they have about
them. The goal of this right is to return control and awareness
to the users of the personal data they share, consciously or
not.
In this frame, we carry out a broad world-scale investigation
on the actual deployment of the GDPR. We perform a step-by-
step analysis of all the phases needed to accomplish a subject
access request (SAR)—the action of request the personal data
to a data controller. In our study, we target 334 of the most
popular web sites according to the Alexa ranking. For the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to conduct a comprehensive
study on this topic with a world distribution of web sites,
so our finding are also useful to refine previous works that
took into account only one phase of the SAR [2], or used
less rigorous methodologies to select the organizations [3], or
could be biased by the small set of data controllers put under
the lens [4].
We find that 19.6% of privacy policy pages are not com-
pliant with the actual regulation. Then, we inquiry all the
targeted web sites requiring our personal data. We study how
the collectors identify the requester, we collect the response,
and monitor the response time. In the end, we obtain our
personal data from almost 65% of the targeted web sites, with
a average time to fulfill the request of 16.4 days. Lastly, we
checked the procedures used by the data controllers to fulfill
the request. In this phase, we find several flaws that affect more
than 32% of targeted data controller, and that could transform
a fundamental right into a new and unpleasant threat.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• World-wide snapshot: We makes a world-wide snapshot
of the actual deployment of the GDPR. We report on the
aggregated metrics about the privacy policy compliance,
the methodology to request the data, the identification
process, the response time, and the response format.
• Response analysis: We analyze the obtained responses
and the data collected by the web sites. Here we find a
clear lack of information on the data returned by the data
controllers. For instance, the same data controller return
a different amount of information depending of the type
of request we made (Right of Data Access or Right of
Data Portability). E-shops that do not return information
at all about the visited pages, then use these information
in re-marketing campaigns.
• Vulnerability analysis: We perform a vulnerability anal-
ysis on the methodology adopted by the data controllers
to transmit the data to the requester. During our collection
phase we find that also the collectors that perform very
well in the identification phase jeopardize the data in the
transmission phase, like sending the data as plain text or
not using secure protocols to send the email.
• Identification robustness: We investigate on the two
most particular cases we found in the identification pro-
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cess: The data controllers that don’t seem to care about
the identity of the requester and those that want an ID
document to correctly identify the requester. In the first
case, we discovered that 8.9% of data controllers actually
disclose the personal data of the users regardless the real
identity of the requester. While, in the second case, we
bear out that the data controllers do not have proper tools
to verify the originality of the ID (i.e. if the ID has been
tampered).
II. RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Selecting the organization to test
To perform our analysis, we gathered the top 50 web sites1
from each of the 12 categories of the Alexa ranking. From
the list, we removed duplicates, e.g. the same web site can
appear under multiple categories, or the same company can
own multiple web sites. Then, we manually visited each
web site. We discarded those who do not provide pages in
languages spoken in the EU because we expect that the web
sites that are not based in the European Economic Area and
offer services to European people have at least a version of
the web site in one of the languages spoken in Europe. We
removed from the list all the web sites that do not provide
a registration procedure. Indeed, we focus on websites that
store personal data linked to identified users. In the end of
the process we selected 334 web sites of the following cate-
gories: Adult (7.5%), Art (5.1%), Business (7.8%), Computer
(9.6%), Games (8.4%), Health (1.8%), Kids & Teen (2.8%),
News (7.2%), Recreation (12.9%), Reference (5.7%), Science
(3.9%), Shopping (15.6%), Society (6%), and Sports (5.4%).
Since the regulation does not apply only to web sites, we
inserted in the list other data collectors—2 banks, 3 transport
companies, and 2 mobile network operators. For the latter
categories of data providers, it is neither easy to create new
accounts nor generate meaningful data. So, we select providers
for whom we owned a long-time active account. Since no
third-party trackers or advertisement networks were in the list,
we manually added to the list 5 of them after the polishing
phase. To select the trackers, we randomly picked 5 active
trackers on our browser from the list reported by the online
tool youronlinechoices2. This tool is provided by the EDAA—
European Interactive Digital Advertising Alliance, a European
industry coalition of advertising agencies.
B. The sign-up phase
As said, we want to be sure that the data controllers have
personal data to return on our request. So, we proceed to create
a new account for each web site. Then, we manually used the
web site for a while, performing actions that the web site
has to log: adding items to favorites, playing videos, making
queries, interacting with the email they send, and so on. During
the registration phase, we discarded 5 web sites because they
did not allow registration. Even though these web sites were
1On May 2019
2http://www.youronlinechoices.com
accessible from Europe, we found out that the registration
form was disabled for European users (indeed, we checked
that these websites do accept registrations from outside the
EU). At the end of the process we have a list of 341 data
collectors to request personal data from.
C. Leading phases of a subject access request
Once we created and initialized all the accounts, our next
step is to request the personal data. During our experiment,
we focused on the most relevant aspects of the process:
privacy policy compliance, the request methodology, the re-
sponse time, the response format, and the completeness of the
information. In the following sections, we explain why we
focused on these aspects and how we evaluated the responses.
1) Privacy policy compliance: The GDPR states that the
data collectors must inform the users about the rights of
requesting a copy of, updating, or deleting their personal
data owned by the data controllers. Moreover, they also must
provide the contact details of the data protection officer (DPO).
The privacy policy page is the place where the users shall be
informed about their rights, so we check if these pages comply
with the GDPR.
2) Request methodology: Data collectors shall facilitate the
exercise of subject data rights (GDPR Article 12 sec. 2). We
focus on the request methodology because we believe that
it represents the primary access to obtain personal data. A
web site that accepts requests only via postal mail or an
international phone call, phone call can discourage the user
from exercising his rights. Conversely, one that offers an online
form facilitates the accessibility to this information.
3) Identification: Since we deal with personal data, it
is crucial that only the owner can access the information
collected by the data controller. Hence, we are interested in
understanding how the controllers ensure that data is provided
only to the right person.
4) Response format: We take into account the type of data
format used by the web sites to provide the data. The GDPR
defines two rights that allow the users to access their personal
data. The first one is the right to access. In this case, to the
best of our knowledge, there are no strict constraints about the
response data format (Article 15). The second is the right of
data portability: the data should be provided in a commonly
used and machine-readable format (Article 20).
5) Response time: Once we received the response, we
computed the amount of time needed by the web sites to send
back the personal data. Indeed, the data controllers have 1
month to process the request and provide the data. If necessary,
the controller can extend that period for additional two months
(GDPR Article 12 sec. 3), but it must communicate the delay
to the user before the end of the first month. Our goal is to
check if the controllers satisfy the timing constraint of the
GDPR. Moreover, we want to understand what is the average
time needed by the controllers to fulfill the request.
6) Information obtained: As the final step, we report on
the information retrieved by the data controllers, and incon-
sistencies we found.
III. RESULTS
A. Privacy policy compliance
To begin our investigation, we want to understand if the
web sites transposed the GDPR law and updated their privacy
policy accordingly. We consider a web site compliant with the
GDPR if it specifies the user’s rights and a contact point for
privacy information on its privacy policy page, or in any of its
pages reachable by a Google query. To compose the query, we
use the name of the web site plus one or a combination of the
following key terms: ”GDPR”, ”users right”, ”data access”,
”Subject Access Request”.
Among all the web sites targeted, we found that 6 out of 341
of them mention neither the user’s right of data access in their
privacy policies nor indicate a contact point. 53 (15.54%) web
sites do not mention the users’ rights, while 3 (0.87%) web
sites do not have any contact point for privacy information.
Finally, the privacy policy pages of 3 web sites (0.87%) do
not work. Consequently, we had to remove 9 web sites since
we had no way to request the data, leaving in our list 332 web
sites.
Analyzing the results, we found that 4 out of 6 data
controllers, that do not report both the rights and the contact
point, are forums or small services related to the video games
world. These findings make us believe that complying with
the GDPR law could be a problem, especially for small sites
and services that are on the low positions of the Alexa global
ranking. However, they can be very popular for a specific
niche of users. Among the 53 data controllers that do not
mention users’ rights, most of them are located outside the
EEA. In their privacy policy, we find 5 of them that explicitly
discourage European people from using their platform, but at
the same time, they allow them to sign up. While 22 out of 53
web sites have privacy policy pages that has not been updated
in the last two years, according to the last update date they
report on the web page.
B. Request Methodology
Every web site implements its procedure to start a subject
access request. Usually, we found the procedure to exercise
the right to access the data described in the privacy policy
page of the data controller. If no information is present on
this page, we contact the DPO via email. We found 4 main
ways to ask the data. In particular, for 219 out of 332 (65.9%)
data controllers it is enough to send an email, while for 11
(3.3%) data controllers the user also need to compile a form
and send it by email. For 96 (28.9%) data controllers it is
possible to request the personal data through a form on the
web site, we also consider in this category the 17 web sites
that expose a button to immediately download the personal
data. Finally, For 6 (1.8%) data controllers, the only way to
perform the request is by standard mail or by an phone call
outside Europe. We leave out from our experiment this last set
of data controllers and we perform the SAR to the remaining
326.
Fig. 1. Percentage of handled SAR request
C. Identification
Before transmitting the data, the DPO is supposed to verify
the identity of the requester. As required by law, the DPO
in this phase can ask for additional information if he has
reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the requester.
We found that web sites that implement a form to perform
the request do not require a further identification if the form
is reachable only by a signed-in user. 2 most scrupulous web
sites request to re-authenticate to finalize the request. Instead,
other data controllers rely on one of the following mechanisms
or a combination of them: identification document, sworn
declaration, phone call, questions about user personal data
(e.g. date of birth, username, address), cookie ID, address of
the email sender, questions about data that can be retrieved
only from inside the account. Table I shows the number of
data controllers that use a specific mechanism to identify
the user, associated with each way to ask the data. Between
parenthesis are reported the number of data controllers that
use a combination of mechanisms.
D. Response obtained
In Fig. 1 are shown the response we obtained from the 326
data controllers. We considered 92 (28.22%) web sites as data
controllers that not handled the request, all the data controllers
that did not answer to the data subject access request within 30
days from the day we forwarded our inquiry, and did not ask
to extend the 30 days period. However, several data controllers
answered after the law period expired, so it is possible that,
eventually, these data controllers would have answered. For
9 (2.7%) of data controllers we targeted in our experiment, it
was not possible to deliver our requests for technical problems,
such as the form did not work or the email of the DPO is
out of space. Moreover, 13 (3.98%) of controllers refused to
provide us with the requested data because, in their opinion,
they are not affected by the GDPR law. Finally, for 212 out
of 326 (65.03%) of data controllers, we were able to obtain
our personal data.
Table II summarizes the results obtained. In the table,
we split the data controllers into two sets: the controllers
that report about the GDPR rights in their privacy policy
and those that do not. Indeed, as we said in Sec. III-A, 53
data controllers did not mention the users’ rights in their
privacy policy. However, we performed the SAR request also
TABLE I
USER IDENTIFICATION MECHANISM BY TYPE OF REQUEST.
Request No Identification ID Log-in Confirmation Questions Cookie Phone call Sworn Declaration
Email 51 22 (3) 10 10 15 (3) 2 3 2
Form 7 2 0 0 0 1 0 0
Online Form 0 9 (3) 59 21 (1) 4 (3) 0 0 1 (1)
Total 58 33 69 19 18 3 3 3
TABLE II
RESPONSE OBTAINED BY GDPR RIGHTS.
GDPR Rights No GDPR Rights
Answered 195 17
Did not answer 69 23
Refused 0 13
Total 264 53
to them, to understand how these data controllers react to
our request. Surprisingly, we found that 17 data controllers
correctly handled the request. While, as we can see from the
Table II none of the data controllers that report about the
GDPR rights explicitly refused to provide the data.
E. Response time
The response time of the data controllers is hugely different.
It can vary from a few seconds to more than 90 days. Of
course, controllers that immediately provide access to personal
data are the ones that have a fully automated procedure, from
the beginning of the request to the data provisioning.
In Fig 2 are shown the percentage of response obtained with
a weekly granularity. Among the 212 controllers that handled
the request, 17.45% answered on the same day of the request,
39.62% in the first half of the month, 26.88% in the second
half, and 13.67% in the second month. 5 data controller needed
more than two months, and 4 more than three. To summarize,
almost all the data controllers satisfy the timing dictated by the
law, with the exception of 23 data controllers. On average, the
controllers needed 16.4 days to fulfill our requests. Globally,
we obtain that 89.15% of controllers that handled our request
comply with the GDPR. This result is in contrast with the
one obtained in [4] in which they found that only the 55%
of respondent controllers handled the requests in time. This
difference is probably due to the more significant amount of
controllers taken into account in our study.
F. Response Format
A large number of controllers (52.7%) answered with a
structured data format—JSON, CSV, XLS or XML— fol-
lowing up a data access request. This result is surprisingly
high if we compare it with the finding of Wong et al. [5].
In their case, they obtained only 55% of structured files after
exercising the right of data portability. So, we believe that
these data controllers have a unique procedure to handle both
the requests for data access and for data portability. The rest
Fig. 2. Percentage of responses obtained weekly.
of the controllers provided us the personal data as raw text or
in a tabular form, directly typed in the email body or as a PDF
attachment. 2 controllers printed our data and sent it to us by
postal mail. We also collected: screenshots of the management
software, scan of printed files, and HTML pages. In the end,
there are controllers that offer in addition to the possibility to
download the data, also a dashboard inside the account. Here,
it is possible to explore efficiently and manage the personal
data collected by them in real-time.
G. Information achieved
As we can expect, all the data controllers provide us all the
information that we provided in the sign-up phase. The laziest
controllers, fortunately few, answered us to check ourselves the
information in our profile page. However, checking the privacy
policy page of these controllers, it is easy to see that their
web sites store much more information, as an example: the IP
address, browser type, and device name. In the data collected
by almost all controllers appear, aside from the information
mentioned above, also the last session log-in with the related
information about the IP, the access time, and the session
time. However, looking better at the information we collected
from most of the data controllers, they seem to be more a
collection of obvious data they had than the result of an inquiry
of personal data they collect. For example, in the case of
e-shops, all the web sites return our transaction history, but
only one returns the list of our research. Once again, looking
back at their privacy policy and thinking of the re-marketing
techniques adopted, it is clear that they also have information
about our research on their site.
Every data controller provides information with different
granularity. For instance, if we compare two MOOC platforms
(Massive Open Online Courses), one returns only the course
to which the user is enrolled, the other returns specific infor-
mation for each learning session. Some giants of the internet
have provided the most interesting information: who paid to
send advertisement to the user, and what criteria have been
used to target the user.
1) Response readability: As we said, almost half of the
controllers provided the response as a structured file. Unfor-
tunately, it is not easy to understand what kind of information
is reported on it. Normally, in a structured data format each
data is associated with one label. While understanding the
meaning of some labels is quite intuitive, for most of the data
provided in this way it is very hard to understand what kind of
information the value represents even by users with a technical
background. We found only 5 controllers that have attached
to their structured response a file in which it is explained how
to interpret the data.
2) Right of data access vs right of data portability: As we
stated in II-C4, in some cases, we requested both the data
access and the data export. Comparing the two sets of data,
we find that the data export has much more information. For
instance, in the data access file only account information has
been provided. Instead, in the file of the data export are present
also details about every session we have done, the IP, and
information related to our operating system and the browser.
So, it is unclear why this information is provided only with
one of the two requests.
3) Third party tracker: Nowadays, almost every web sites
includes in the pages several scripts that collect information
about the users or inject cookies that track them across the
web. Among all the data collected, only 6 collectors provided
such information. Even though these data is used to profile
the users, and the web sites exploit that information to deliver
targeted content, the web site itself is not the owner of the
data. This kind of data decentralization means that the user
who wants to know all the information that a web site handles
about him has to perform a separate subject access request to
all the services integrated into the web site. Unfortunately, this
solution is almost impractical because of the large number of
third-party services used by the web sites—more than 30 on
average if we consider the private news media [6].
4) Email tracking: Among all the responses we obtained,
only 2 data controllers provided us with a document containing
information about the advertisement or communication emails
they send and the information about email tracking [7].
Through this technique it is possible for the sender to infer
a large amount of private data. From a single email, it is
possible to know information such as the IP and the device
of the user. By sending with a proper timing the email, and
analyzing the data, it is possible to infer the daily routine of
the user, estimate the geographical area where he lives and
where he works [8], [9]. So we believe that this information
should be considered private data that the data controllers must
provide to the owner only. To be sure that the email received
was tracked and we interacted with them, we installed on our
browser the Ugly Email3 tool. This tool scans the raw email
looking for tracking elements. When it finds one, it raises an
alert. Even though this tool is not able to detect every kind of
tracking, no one of the data controllers we detected using this
technology provides information about the email tracking.
IV. PRIVACY CONCERNS
In this section, we discuss the privacy concerns that emerged
by our analysis of the procedures to provide the personal data
and to identify the requesting user. We find that more than
50% of data collectors that handled our request suffer from
flaws that can compromise the users’ privacy.
A. Sharing data via email and no email encryption
We received most of the personal data by email. 82 of
these shared the data as a plain file or a zip folder without
using any security measure. Sending sensitive data as plain
email or plain attachment can be risky, in fact, the email can
be sent to an incorrect recipient. Moreover, since the email
and the attached file are saved on the email server, there is
the risk that an attacker gains unauthorized access to it, as
it happened in the recent past [10]. Sending personal data as
an encrypted file is a best-practice encouraged by companies,
universities [11], government authorities [12], or as part of the
GDPR interpretation [13].
Instead, among the data collectors that send the personal
data encrypted via email, 20 of them send also the password
to decrypt the data on the same email account, or even in
the same email with the data attached. This solution is clearly
ineffective.
We also found 3 interesting cases, where the controllers
correctly encrypt the data and send the password on a different
channel. However, a careful observer can quickly note that
the passwords used to encrypt the data follow a pattern
based on the requester data. Examples of these patterns are:
user’s surname concatenated to the same string, user’s date
of birth, or the user’s full name. We double-check these
patterns requesting the personal data to these controllers from
3 different accounts.
Finally, 2 of the collectors that use the email channel
to provide the data, neither encrypt the file containing the
personal data nor use TSL or s/MIME schemes to send the
email, exposing the personal data to sniffing or a man-in-the-
middle attacks.
B. Identity card
Most of data collectors base the access data request on
the email exchange between the designed data protection
officer and the user. To verify the identity of the users,
we found that 33 of them required the scan of an ID as
proof of identity. Among of them 2 required to send the
scan of two different IDs. Although this identification process
could appear reasonable at first sight, it raises many concerns.
All the data collectors that ask for a proof of identity via
email, do not provide a secure form or guidelines on how
3https://uglyemail.com/
Fig. 3. A ”Super Mario” example of obfuscated document. From the driving
license we hide the owner’s: photo, city of birth (field 3), date of release
(field 4a), expiring date (field 4b), issuing entity (field 4c), ID number (field
5) residence address (field 8).
to send the ID, exposing the user to the threats described in
section IV-A. Moreover, it is unknown if the document sent
is adequately stored to preserve the user privacy, deleted after
the authentication phase, or if it remains on the email server.
During our investigation, an ID was also asked by data
collectors that have no information about our identity, so it is
unclear how the ID can help them to establish the ownership of
the account. Finally, we notice that for all those collectors that
required a document, except one related to the cryptocurrency
world, it is enough a photo of the ID’s front page and does not
provide any guidelines on how to take it. This behavior raises
the suspect that data collectors do not have tools to verify the
authenticity of the document. Many IDs have the serial number
on the back page. While through a photo it is not possible to
verify most of the security features of the documents such as
holograms, watermarks, or optically variable ink.
1) Tampering the document: Probably the best way to
verify our intuition is to forge an identity document, but for
ethical reasons, we do not choose this way. So, we altered
a document of one of the authors in order to have an image
of the document that can be considered even worse of a well
forged one. In particular, we manipulate our own identification
ID in the following way:
(a) We pixelize the document, reducing the quality of the
image scaling down its resolution. In particular, we
substitute each square of 10x10 pixels with a single-pixel
valued with the average of all the pixels contained in the
mask. Fig 4 shows a detail of an ID document before and
after the scaling.
(b) We completely hide all the information contained in the
document, even the owner’s picture, putting on top of
them a black layer. We leave only the full name and
the date of birth of the document owner. Fig 3 shows
an example of an obfuscated document. Then we also
scaled down the document, to have a pixelized image
with obfuscated information.
Once we obtain our tampered documents, we perform a SAR
request to 25 out of 33 data controllers that required a docu-
Fig. 4. A detail of the original photo of the identification document (on the
left) and the same detail after we scaled down the quality of the image (on
the right).
ment. We leave out from the experiment the data controllers
that required 2 identification documents and the 6 that use a
combination of identification procedures. We send to all them
a document of type (b), if they refuse the document because
it is redacted, we carry a document of type (a). At the end of
the authentication phase, 21 out of 25 data controllers accepted
our documents of type (b). While, the 4 data controllers that
refused the document, accepted the ones of type (a), and also
provide us the data. These results clearly show that most of
the data controllers do not have proper tools/procedures or
put enough effort into validating the identification documents.
Moreover, we believe that this kind of identification procedure,
even though it is powerful if appropriately applied, with the
actual implementation it only exposes the users to useless
risks.
C. Email as authentication
Nowadays, most of the online services are tied to the email
account, so its access credentials should be kept as secret
as the pin of a bank account. However, analyzing the data
from data breaches it is easy to note that a large number of
users use trivial passwords. As an example, 23.2 million victim
accounts worldwide used ’123456’ as password [10]. At the
same time, it is also well known that users tend to reuse the
same password on different web services [2], and so even if
there is no breach from the email provider, a breach on another
service can compromise the email account as well.
Along with our study, we found that 51 data controllers
do not require additional information to the requester if the
request comes from the same email address used to sign-up
on the web site. This lack of control can be prone to spoofing
attacks. Since these 51 web sites seem to put less care in user
identification, we want to understand their policy better.
To understand the robustness of their identification process,
we simulate an attack on these data controllers. In our model,
the attacker knows only the full name of the victim and the
email address. So, we consider that the attacker achieves his
goal to steal the private data of the victim only if the data
controllers do not perform any kind of check about the identity
of the requester.
Them, to perform the attack, we create a new email account,
that looks very similar to the original one. As an example,
the original one is ”johndoe@provider.com” and the new one
is ”johnndoe@provider.com”. Moreover, we set up the email
account to display the name of the victim. Finally, in our
request, we explicitly ask the data belonging to the original
email address, and we sign all the emails with the name of
the victim.
We contact all the 51 data controllers that apparently
base their user identification on the email address, and we
perform a SAR on behalf of the original account. Table III
shown the number of data controllers we investigated, and
the number of those vulnerable according to their category.
As a result, we obtain that 19 data controllers provide us the
data of the targeted account without carrying out other further
identification processes. The others follow up the request
with an identity verification phase. More in details 6 data
controllers ask for an ID, 10 ask to perform the request from
the original email address, 3 made knowledgeable questions, 5
send a confirmation email on the real email address and stop
the communication, 2 requests to perform the request from
inside the web site. 1 data controller that belongs to the adult
category, follows up our malicious requests in an unorthodox
way. Indeed, the DPO informed us about the kind of data
stored by the web site, and notified to us that he deleted the
victim’s account. To be sure that it wasn’t a deceptive answer,
as a response to our attack, we double-checked if the account
had been actually deleted, and it had. Notice that when we
made the same request from the original email account, they
provided us all the information requested. Now, even though
this countermeasure is effectively against our attack, it is not
fair towards the real owner of the account that lost the account
without any communication. Finally, the remaining 5 data
controllers simply ignored the request.
With regards to the 19 data controllers that disclosed the
personal data, we are sure that at least 10 of them noticed that
the email address of the sender does not match with the one for
whom we requested the data. In fact, 0 of these data controllers
initially answered to our SAR that they have no data related
to the fake email address. Then, after we pointed out to them
that our request is on behalf of another email address, they
share on the fake email address the personal data of victim.
The last data controller, in addition to sending us the data of
the victim, he also updated the log-in credential with the fake
email.
D. Data escalation
In the light of the flaws we found, it is clear that an attacker,
even with partial knowledge about the victim like full name
and email, can jeopardize his privacy. The attacker can build
up a chain of requests to gather a lot of personal data. Most
vulnerable data controllers could provide initial information
such as the date of birth, interests, the IP address, and so the
area where the user lives. From this information, the attacker
can forge an obfuscated identity document. Doing so, the
attacker can acquire additional personal data and refine the
document. As the knowledge about the victim increases, the
attacker can start to perform data requests even to the websites
that use stronger identification procedures. Even if it is not
possible to cheat all the data controllers, the total amount
of possible information retrieved can still be remarkable. The
feasibility of this kind of attack has been proved in [3].
TABLE III
FAKE EMAIL ATTACK RESULTS.
Category (#)Attacked (#)Vulnerable
Adult 4 0
Art 4 1
Business 4 0
Computer 2 0
Health 1 1
Games 4 3
Kids & Teen 1 0
News 4 1
Recreation 5 3
Reference 3 3
Science 2 1
Shopping 11 2
Society 3 3
Sports 3 1
Total 51 19
V. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In this work, we analyzed 334 data controllers that appear
in the top position of the Alexa rank. In all the experiments,
we only tried to access data related to the authors of this
work. We neither forge any identification document nor carried
out an active attack against the server or the network of the
targeted data controllers. Consequently, and accordingly to the
policy of our IRB, we did not need any explicit authorization
to perform our experiments.
At the light of the concerning results we obtained, even
though we neither disclose the entities affected by flaws nor
we reported them to the authorities, we firmly believe that
the noticed issues should be fixed for the privacy of the end-
users. So, we got in touch with the data controllers affected
by flaws to perform a responsible disclosure. We sent to
each data controller an email describing our research, the
flaws we noticed, how to reproduce them, and suggesting
countermeasures and best practices.
VI. RELATED WORK
Since the GDPR entered into force one year ago, its effect
on the web sites and companies has been studied from several
prospective. Sorensen et al. [6] analyze how the GDPR impacts
on the presence of third-party trackers on web sites. They
collected data belonging on 1250 popular web sites among a
span range of four months before and after the GDPR entered
into force. They observed that in the time range of observation,
some categories such as private news, shopping travel, and
entertainment presented a reduction in terms of the unique
number of third-party web services, while in other categories,
this number increases. Hence, they conclude that the GDPR
does not clearly affect the presence of third-party on web sites.
Wong et al. [5] investigate the compliance of the files format
after a request for data portability (Article 20) on 230 data
controllers. Once achieved, all the responses they found that
only 40% of data format is compliant with the GDPR law, and
55% of data controllers comply with the GDPR.
Urban et al. [4] focused on the response time aspect of the
GDPR. They perform a request to access to their personal
data to 38 different tracking services. At the end of their
investigation, they get that only 55% of the companies targeted
handled the request within the required time, while only 24%
provided the data. In the Black Hat ’19 event, Pavur et al. [3]
show that it is possible to exploit the GDPR to jeopardize
the privacy of the users. In particular, they perform SAR to
150 data controllers. They send to them a letter designed
with the explicit intent to be vague and complex to satisfy,
with the intent to distract the controller from the identity
verification aspects of the law. They found that an attacker with
few information about the victim, retrieved with open-source
intelligence techniques, can get access to the data of 24%
of the data controllers under investigation. A similar attack
was carried out in [14]. Here the author targeted 55 Belgian
organizations. They were able to impersonate the victim and
get their personal data from 15 out of 55 controllers using
several techniques, among which document tampering and
email spoofing. Finally, Cagnazzo et al. [15] exploiting a social
engineering flaw, was able to retrieve personal data from 10
out of 14 German companies. They forged an email address
that looks like one of the victims. From the forged email
address, they contact the companies to update personal info
about the victim. Finally, some days later, they perform the
subject access request from the forged email.
Differently from these works, for the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to conduct a comprehensive world-scale
investigation. In our work, we deal with all the phases involved
in the process, from the privacy policy pages to the response
analysis, to end with the individuation of flaws of the data
controllers.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we conducted a thorough investigation of the
actual deployment of the GDPR law. We investigated about
341 data controllers worldwide, 334 of which are in the top
rank for their category according to the Alexa rank. Our results
that, to the best our knowledge, are unique in terms of scale
provide meaningful insights on the handling of the subject
access request by the controllers. In particular, we found that,
for several reasons, it was impossible to obtain the data for
36.14% of the targeted web sites. The 88.6% of controllers
that addressed the request responded within the GDPR time
constraint, and needed an average of 16.4 days to fulfill the
request. In many cases the data are provided in structured files
that are hard to interpret, without any guidelines on the file
structure from the controller. Lastly, we take into account how
controllers transmit the data to the users and how they identify
the requester. Surprisingly, we found that almost 50% of the
data controllers that handled the request are affected by flaws
that can compromise the users’ privacy.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
As future work, we intend to analyze the relationship
between the way the data controllers handle the subject access
request and their position in the Alexa rank or the categories
they belong to. We believe that there is a need for a more
in-depth analysis of the completeness of the information
provided. Since it is hard to estimate what information the
web sites store, as assessment could be done comparing the
information they declare to store in the privacy policy pages,
with the ones retrieved with a subject access request. In
this work, we targeted web sites that are the most important
in terms of web traffic. Moreover, most of them belong to
big companies that have resources to update their systems
to comply with the GDPR. As future work, it is interesting
to investigate web sites that are at the lower positions of
the rank. We believe that it is also appealing to conduct
the same analysis on mobile applications. Indeed, the mobile
application markets are abundant in applications developed by
small companies or independent developers. We suppose that
these subjects are more prone to be non-compliant with the
GDPR.
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